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Beyond Transgression: Toward a Free
Market in Morality
Richard A. Posner. Sex and Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992. Pp. vii, 458. $29.95.
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese
With his special gift for contrariety, Judge Richard Posner places his
ambitious investigation of the vicissitudes of sex under the aegis of a
quote from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: "Pleasures are an impedi-
ment to rational deliberation, and the more so the more pleasurable they
are, such as the pleasures of sex-it is impossible to think about anything
while absorbed in them." Posner then devotes the ensuing 442 dense
pages to challenging Aristotle's assertion. That sex and reason normally
make incompatible bedfellows should not be taken as evidence that it is
impossible to subject sex to the rigors of reason. Sex, Posner suggests
throughout the book, must be considered as one form of behavior among
many, no more nor less immune to the operations of the rational mind.
Posner's commitment to the power of rationality, as he understands it,
constitutes the great strength and ultimate weakness of his work. And it
is easy to imagine that many readers will find his rational foray into sex
infuriating. He has no patience for the facile confusion of sex with pas-
sion, much less of sex with desire, which so mesmerizes contemporary
critics. Posner's discussion of sex has more to do with theories of animal
behavior than with the feelings of individuals. In this respect the great
strength of Posner's book overlaps with its most disturbing weakness,
namely, his determination to organize complex human behavior in pre-
dictable-and largely determined-patterns.
Throughout Sex and Reason Posner sails against the tide of recent
political attitudes that emphasize the claims of subjectivity and personal
experience and cluster together in what is loosely known as the "politics
of identity." Personalism, Posner forcefully argues, does not preclude
flagrant efforts to impose normative judgments upon others. So he turns
to a combination of economics and sociobiology to place contemporary
passions in perspective. In this sense Sex and Reason embodies the mind
of an unflinching skeptic who is willing to question anything and to be
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bound by little or nothing. Human history and contemporary challenges
alike emerge from Posner's pages as manifestations of structural-he pre-
fers "functional"-patterns. To see ourselves from his perspective is to
see ourselves as just another colony of ants. The experience is humbling
and, up to a point, salutary. It assuredly provides a welcome corrective
to the imperialistic personalism that leads people of various political
positions to attempt to impose their "values" upon others. Up to a point,
the perspective is admirable, reminding us that we are manifestations of
life rather than its essence. It was, notwithstanding differences, the per-
spective of the great theologians (e.g., Thomas Aquinas).
My reservations about Posner's view of sex derive less from his
attempt to locate our immediate debates in a broad, agnostic perspective
than from his underlying assumptions about rationality, which he
unflinchingly identifies with the rationality of free-market, neoclassical
economics. That this rationality must, in the measure possible, abstract
from passion is not the issue. Posner's insistence upon the legitimate
claims of rationality implicitly aligns him against those-notably femi-
nists and critical legal theorists-who so insistently proclaim that any
claim of rationality or, heaven forbid, impartiality in the law mocks and
masks the domination of some over others. It is this domination which
the law serves, pretenses to the contrary notwithstanding. The issue,
however, is the basis upon which one defends abstraction from the play
of individual passions and interests.
Here, in my judgment, Posner takes something less than the neutral
ground he claims. The defense of rationality in intellect and impartiality
in the law does not require a grounding in free-market economics and
may even be weakened by it. Not all societies, indeed precious few, have
shared our predilection for the freedom of commodities and transactions
as proxy for justice among individuals. Indeed, to turn Posner's tactics
upon him, one could argue that across history and cultures, societies
have been more likely to privilege the reproduction of the community
than the private economic gain of individuals. Anticipating this kind of
objection, Posner counters that his model does not depend upon the
transhistorical projection of economic relations, but upon economic rea-
soning, which he equates with rational choice and which, in his view,
does apply across history and culture (pp. 86-87).
Defending his economic theory and method as an attempt to find
"unity in diversity," Posner dismisses the predictable objections that his
perspective is "dehumanizing, ideological, complacent, imperialistic,
reactionary" (p. 86). He insists fairly that the point of any theory is to
organize seemingly disparate phenomena into categories that permit
meaningful analysis. Here and throughout, Posner identifies his primary
enemies as those who claim priority for the immediacy and irreducibility
of personal experience. But personalism does not constitute the strong-
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est, nor even a good, ground from which to criticize him. I have no
serious quarrel with Posner's interest in identifying general patterns in
human behavior. My quarrels are, first, with his tendency to return in
each instance to what he sees as unchanging patterns of behavior, and,
therefore, to neglect the historical development of specific human com-
munities and societies; and, second, with his tendency to attribute mod-
em individualist reasoning to societies in which the primacy of the
individual was entirely foreign.'
In a crude way it is safe to assume that human societies, in contradis-
tinction to their individual members, do tend to follow broad productive
and reproductive strategies and tend to develop norms and taboos to jus-
tify and enforce them. As they become more entrenched and more com-
plex, societies may well develop internal conflicts, initially, over norms
and eventually, as in our case, even over taboos. Over time the politics of
societies also tend increasingly to articulate their growing divisions by
class and even, eventually, by gender, race, and ethnicity. Over time the
history of the justification and enforcement of the norms and taboos
acquires its own force. As a result, societies' pursuit of what might seem
to an impartial observer to be their "objective," rational strategies is
mediated by the history of how they have become themselves. As the
paleontologist Loren Eiseley has pointed out, human evolution proceeds
within a human, not a "natural" environment and human beings mature
to a world that has been shaped by other human beings.2 Notwithstand-
ing the considerable virtues of Posner's model, it does not take adequate
account of the complex social and cultural environment in which the
current -debates about sexuality are occurring.
Within living memory sex has moved from behind the veil of propri-
ety-some would say hypocrisy-with which bourgeois societies sought
to shroud it, into the glare of public and frequently acrimonious discus-
sion. At an accelerating rate since the late 1960s, sexual issues have
become the most visible signs of political and cultural contention in a
vigorously contentious society. The list includes abortion, homosexual-
ity, pornography, rape, sexual harassment, surrogate motherhood, incest
and other forms of sexual abuse, exploitation, and exhibitionism. If
nothing else, the extent and intensity of the discussions confirm that sex
is anything but a private matter, although according to Posner, knowl-
edge about sex remains sketchy and imprecise.
The sex wars pit those who seek to shore up what they regard as tradi-
tional family values against those who seek to defend the maximum indi-
1. For an elaboration, see my Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); and for my views on the complexity of economic
reasoning, see my The Origins of Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-
Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976).
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vidual autonomy in experience and expression. This is the familiar war
between those who defend the fetus's right to life and those who defend a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion, between those who oppose
and those who defend the extension of homosexual rights, between those
who oppose and those who defend the allocation of federal support for an
exhibit of Mapplethorpe's photographs. Innumerable guerrilla wars, in
which the alignment of parties becomes murky, cut across this great
divide. Thus feminists, who normally support a woman's right to choose
to have an abortion, split over the question of surrogate motherhood and
over restrictions upon the dissemination of pornography.3
As suggested by the language of rights, in which so many of the issues
are cast, the sex wars are primarily being fought on the terrain of law. In
Sex and Reason Posner proposes to bring some order into the debates,
first by summarizing the vast literature on sex for the benefit of his fellow
judges who, he wittily suggests, tend "to know next to nothing about the
subject beyond their own personal experience"-which may be even
more limited than that of ordinary citizens because of the elaborate
screening procedures that virtually exclude people with "irregular sex
lives" from the judiciary (p. 1). Second, and more ambitiously, Posner
aims to present a positive and normative theory of sexuality "that both
explains the principal regularities in the practice of sex and in its social,
including legal regulation and points the way toward reforms in that reg-
ulation" (pp. 2-3).
Posner, while acknowledging both the "intense emotionality of the
sexual act" and the grounding of sexual desire and preference in human
biology, holds that sexual behavior, like other aspects of volitional
human behavior, is subject to rational choice, which, in his view, means
the principles of economic analysis (p. 3). Yet he seems faintly puzzled,
and even a little impatient, to find that, to date, sexuality has escaped the
grasp of rationality. And to correct this inattention, he advances a
"functional, secular, instrumental, utilitarian" theory that draws heavily
upon what he calls "the economic theory of sexuality" (p. 3).
Posner insists upon the significance of sexuality in contradistinction to
sex, which is not what his theory or its rivals are about. The term "sexu-
ality" signals a concern with the social context and implications of sex,
including attitudes and customs as well as practices. Sexuality, in this
sense, is a concern of law and, by extension, of an economic theory of the
law. He regards the principal-"uncompromising, truly unassimil-
able"-rival to the economic theory of sexuality as "a heterogeneous
cluster of moral theories" (p. 3). Posner respects the moral theories of
sexuality, both because of their intrinsic interest and because most mem-
3. For a recent example, see Tamar Lewin, "Furor on Exhibit at Law School Splits Feminists,"
New York Times, Friday, 13 Nov. 1992, B9.
[Vol. 5: 243
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/16
Fox-Genovese
bers of our society subscribe to them. But they are not his primary con-
cern. Moral and religious beliefs, by which some would judge sexuality,
cannot be reduced "to genuine social interests or practical incentives,"
which makes them incompatible with the broadly scientific outlook that
informs his own economic theory (p. 4).
HISTORY AND SEXUALITY
Sex and Reason falls into three distinct but overlapping parts: "The
History of Sexuality," "A Theory of Sexuality," and "The Regulation of
Sexuality," with the first two understood as the indispensable backdrop
or building blocks for the third. Posner's cavalier romp through the his-
tory of sexuality, admittedly prefaced with caveats and apologies, shows
all of the disregard for complexity and ambiguity common to enthusias-
tic system-builders, even the most learned and insightful. In this section
Posner is primarily concerned to sketch the range of variation in social
attitudes toward and regulation of sexual practices and attitudes. Within
a broad range, he especially seeks to demonstrate the far-reaching differ-
ences between two basic types of societies, respectively based on compan-
ionate and noncompanionate marriage.
This distinction forms the bedrock of Posner's distinction between two
major groups of sexual practices and attitudes. In his view societies that
practice noncompanionate marriages, including polygamy, tend to
sequester women and to sustain very permissive attitudes towards vari-
ous forms of extra-marital sex, thus effectively severing erotic from pro-
creative sex. In contrast, societies that practice companionate marriage
emphasize the bond between erotic and procreative sex and, accordingly,
display a much lower tolerance for sexual adventures and deviations of
all kinds.
Fifth-century Athens offers his clearest example of what he takes to be
the consequences of noncompanionate marriage. There, he believes, men
married women whom they probably did not love and with whom they
were not expected to spend much time except for the occasional obliga-
tory sexual encounters that produced offspring. The objects of their sex-
ual interest and desire, Posner contends, were adolescent boys of their
own class or accomplished, upper-class courtesans. The Greeks, Posner
insists, openly accepted homosexual acts, although not between men of
the same age and class and not between lesbians, but their understanding
of homosexuality differed significantly from ours. Posner does not
believe that the men of the Athenian citizen class were especially preoc-
cupied with homoerotic desire: For them homosexuality was one among
many possible forms of sexual release available to men who were not yet
married or not emotionally tied to their wives. Many Greek men, like
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men who would take the anus of an attractive young boy if the vagina of
an attractive young woman were unavailable (p. 149).
Posner takes Catholic and Protestant Europe as prime examples of
companionate marriage, which concerns marriage between (more or less)
social equals, who are expected to treat each other with love and respect
and to share a close association in running the household and raising
children. Like the mores of noncompanionate marriage, those of com-
panionate marriage place a high premium on the pre-marital virginity
and marital fidelity of wives, primarily to safeguard the legitimacy of off-
spring. Thus the professed mutuality of companionate marriage, with its
ideal of confining sex to marriage, uneasily coexists with a persisting sex-
ual double standard. Practice, Posner allows, did not always live up to
the ideal: many peasants did not bother to marry; most marriages were
arranged; members of the clergy frequently kept concubines or engaged
in homosexual relations; prostitution flourished. From the early medie-
val through the modern eras, European societies, nonetheless, tended to
proclaim their intolerance of extra-marital sex, from masturbation to
homosexuality.
The sharp distinction between companionate and noncompanionate
marriage serves Posner's argument well but slights the complexity of the
historical record. For most of world history, noncompanionate mar-
riages of various kinds have probably been the norm, especially among
ruling classes (including the citizen class of fifth-century Athens), which
primarily viewed marriage as an essential element in consolidating and
advancing the interests of families. While the Catholic Church espoused
the idea of companionate marriage, it did so, in part, as a way of
attracting pagans to the Church and, increasingly, as a way of strength-
ening its position against powerful families. Officially, the Church also
opposed extra-marital sex, though it felt compelled to tolerate it, to some
degree, in practice. Thus in some ways the early-modern (companionate)
Catholic nobility behaved much as Posner describes fifth-century
(noncompanionate) Athenians as having behaved. The Protestant Refor-
mation gave new impetus to the idea of companionate marriage, but the
idea in its modern form seems only to have gained broad acceptance dur-
ing the eighteenth century, when modern ideas of motherhood and
female sexuality also took hold.4 Tellingly, these developments coincided
closely with the rise and expansion of capitalism, including the economic,
4. We know less about the beliefs and behavior of various peasant populations, although it is
possible that, having less reason to be concerned with dynastic politics and more reason to be
concerned with the smooth functioning of small agricultural households, they hewed closer to the
practices, if not the ideology, of companionate marriage than did their social superiors. See my
"Women and Work," French Women in the Age of Enlightenment, ed. Samia Spencer (Bloomington,
Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984), 111-27; Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese,
Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Europe
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), ch. 11; Natalie Zemon Davis, "Ghosts, Kin, and
Progeny: Some Features of Family Life in Early Modern France," Daedalus 106, no. 2: 87-114;
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technological, and demographic changes that have so decisively shaped
the changing relations of women and men during the twentieth century.
Posner's casual attitude toward historical complexity does not neces-
sarily invalidate his argument-at least not at the abstract level at which
he casts it. But that casual attitude revealingly underscores the function-
alist nature of the argument. For Posner, history is more interesting as
the raw material for theoretical system-building than as a process of
development. Or, to put it differently, he has little interest in the specific
dynamics of historical change. Brushing aside charges of reductionism,
he claims that his goal is to identify central and recurring phenomena
and to free them from the clutches of the specialized vocabularies
beneath which their similarities are normally concealed. In this spirit he
enunciates the claim "that much of the variance in sexual behavior and
customs across cultures and eras is explained by a handful of factors,
such as the sex ratio (which is far more variable than is usually assumed),
the extent of urbanization, and, above all, the changing occupational role
of women" (p. 86). In his attempt to explain the variance, he relies upon
theory, which he views "as a source of testable hypotheses" (p. 86). He
fails to note that his factors are not all of the same kind and, more seri-
ously, that some, notably the occupational status of women, are not what
social scientists call "independent variables"-that is, they are not, prop-
erly speaking, causative.
THEORIES OF SEXUALITY
Posner's intellectual interests emerge most clearly in his section on the
theory of sexuality, in which he draws upon propositions from the biol-
ogy of sex and from economics. He sensibly dismisses the notion that a
viable economic theory of sex must explain everything about sex, main-
taining that, as an analyst of rational choice, the economist "understands
that choice is constrained by circumstances that may have nothing to do
with economics" (p. 87). Thus, any such economic analysis must take
the sex drive itself as given. Beyond that, such a theory must recognize
that the possible range of sex acts is largely determined by biological and
developmental factors and that the object of the sex drive is partly a
given and partly a choice. These premises, Posner asserts, should not be
taken as evidence that he assigns biology to the realm of determinism and
economics to the realm of freedom. He views both theories as equally
deterministic, insisting that both can be reduced to an analysis of benefits
and costs. The difference between them lies in biology's concern with
our uniform species and economics' concern with cultural, and hence
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local, benefits and costs that help to explain the variety of sexual customs
and attitudes.
Even Posner's most thoughtful qualifications fail to grapple directly
with a central problem in the application of rational choice theory to
complex human relations, namely, that although people frequently-per-
haps even normally-tend to behave rationally in the aggregate, they
may not do so as individuals. He also slights the significance of societies'
political choices, which may prove less than rational and which may
shape a society's future development, thus altering the base line from
which its future choices will be made. Rational choice theorists' obvious
answer to my objection would be that even apparently irrational social
choices may, upon further investigation, turn out to have been rational
from a larger point of view. Thus, if you step back far enough, the
Germans' election of Hitler in 1933 may have been the most rational
response to a threatening situation, notwithstanding its ultimate costs.
Such are the tautological pitfalls of any functionalist argument: What is
had to be because it is.
Posner, who doubts that sexual preferences can be entirely explained
by cultural factors, accepts most of the insights of sociobiology, notably
that individuals and peoples strive to ensure maximum reproduction of
their genes and that men and women pursue different sexual strategies.
He especially emphasizes the biological foundation of the link between
reproductive and sexual strategies. He considers fundamental the sexual
distinction according to which men can inseminate countless women,
whereas women, who must devote nine months to sustaining a fetus and
frequently more to nursing an infant, can only receive infrequent insemi-
nation. This sexual division of labor leads women to pursue conservative
sexual strategies, men to pursue aggressive ones. In his view the "over-
mastering male sex drive incites a competition among men for women"
that may result in a few strong men's monopoly of a disproportionate
number of women (p. 99).
Although Posner acknowledges the limits of sociobiology, he takes
seriously the biological foundations of human sexuality and holds that
the best explanation for "real," in contradistinction to opportunistic,
homosexuality is genetic (p. 296). Here, as elsewhere throughout the
book, he asserts that the core of homosexuality lies not in the occasional
participation in homosexual acts but in homosexual preference. He sug-
gests that "real" homosexuals, of whom there are fewer women than
men, account for roughly 2.5 percent of the population-not the 10 per-
cent or more that homosexual activists normally claim (p. 294). Yet he
views genes as influences on behavior, not determinants of it. Genes may
well incline women to pursue a conservative sexual strategy, but in cul-
tures in which women do not depend upon men, "many women resist the
genetic inclination and abandon the conservative strategy" (p. 109). Sim-
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ilarly, real homosexual men pursue different strategies and face different
problems in accordance with their social and cultural milieu. In a society
of noncompanionate marriage, a homosexual can meet the minimal
responsibilities of marriage and procreation while pursuing his erotic life
elsewhere; in a society of companionate marriage, that strategy becomes
problematic.
The problem with this argument brings us back to Posner's timing of
the emergence of companionate marriage. Throughout the medieval and
early modem periods, divorce remained virtually unavailable-with
Henry VIII of England a notorious exception. Thus, although married
men had affairs, frequented prostitutes, raped lower-class women, and
engaged in sexual acts with other men, they were not significantly more
likely to dissolve or escape from their marriages on that account than
were ancient Athenians. Even after the ideology of companionate mar-
riage took hold during the eighteenth century, divorce remained difficult
and uncommon. And, significantly, there was no clear recognition of
homosexuality as a possible expression of male identity. Although the
causation remains obscure, it is clear that homosexuality emerged as a
recognized identity toward the end of the nineteenth century,5 at roughly
the same time that divorce became more accessible and that mothers
began to get custody of children upon the dissolution of a marriage.
In our own time, the term "homosexual" has gradually given way to
the self-affirming term "gay," and even to "queer," as an explicit act of
cultural reappropriation. That the period of this evolution has also been
marked by the emergence of no-fault divorce and, more recently, by the
public affirmation of the choice of single motherhood, should make us
thoughtful. What we might call the transformation of homosexuality
from one sexual practice among many to a self-proclaimed erotic identity
has, above all, coincided with the modem world's unprecedented accept-
ance of love and personal gratification as an appropriate standard for
social norms and practices. Posner does not explore the connection.
Posner develops his understanding of these changes in discussions of
the theory of sexuality from the perspective of economics, optimal regu-
lation, and morality. Drawing heavily upon comparisons with contem-
porary Sweden, he emphasizes the revolutionary changes in women's
lives, sexuality, and gender relations that have exploded during the twen-
tieth century. Sweden, he suggests, has effectively turned reproduction
over to women by substituting the tax-payer for the husband as the
source of maternity and child support. Under these conditions Swedish
women, who no longer need male protection, have little reason "to sur-
render their freedom and share control of their children" (p. 168). And
5. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley
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Sweden represents but a specific instance in a general trend of women's
declining economic dependence upon men, which, in turn, has led
women to shift their sexual strategy. With male protection of steadily
diminishing importance to women, women have proven steadily less will-
ing to "provide the commodity used to purchase that protection-female
chastity" (p. 171). For Posner, this decline in female chastity constitutes
"the most dramatic manifestation of the sexual revolution" (p. 171).
MORALITY AND THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY
Posner's historical and theoretical discussions, which are richer and
more extensive than this sketch can capture, lay the foundation for his
exploration of and recommendations for the regulation of sexuality in the
United States today. Posner advances evidence that suggests that the
United States tends to punish sex crimes more heavily than do other
developed nations, but to punish non-sex crimes less heavily. Signifi-
cantly, the United States also seems to criminalize more forms of sexual
conduct than do other developed nations. Posner openly acknowledges
that his evidence, which derives from his somewhat arbitrary comparison
of non-random samples, should hardly be taken as conclusive. Problems
with the evidence notwithstanding, his basic argument is intuitively plau-
sible, and all the more interesting since we do know that the United
States leads the industrialized world in violent (non-sex) crime.6
The evidence that the United States punishes sex crimes more heavily
than other industrialized nations might easily be taken to suggest that the
legacy of Puritanism continues to weigh heavily on American culture,
although Posner gives more credit to the Catholic Church than the Prot-
estant denominations for attempting to enforce puritanical sexual atti-
tudes. More interesting and important is Posner's suggestion that the
true source of American public attitudes towards sex lies in the country's
moral and religious diversity. We are, in effect, a nation of contested
moralities and our anxieties about those differences tend to result in puni-
tive rather than permissive attitudes. In contrast, Sweden, which is at
once more religiously homogeneous and more homogeneously non-obser-
vant, is much more permissive and yet ends up with not merely fewer sex
crimes but fewer abortions.
These and other considerations lead Posner to propose that rational
thinking about sex requires that we sever sex from morality-that we
learn to regard sex with moral indifference. According to his positive
economic theory of sexual behavior, it is reasonable to attribute the type
and frequency of different sexual practices-in contradistinction to the
sex drive and sexual preference-to "rational responses to opportunities
6. On the prevalence of violent crime, see, for example, Deborah Prothrow-Stith with Michaele
Weissman, Deadly Consequences (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).
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and constraints" (p. 111). From this perspective it logically follows that
if the costs of one kind of sexual behavior become too high, rational indi-
viduals will substitute another that costs less. When heterosexual male
prisoners lack access to women, they will turn to men. When the costs of
infanticide skyrocket, women who wish to terminate pregnancies will
turn to abortion. And so forth. If we learn to regard sex with moral
indifference, we will accept only such limitations of sexual freedom as are
"required by economic or other utilitarian conditions" (p. 180).
Posner's main quarrel with the moral theory of sex lies in his convic-
tion that it has lost its hegemony. If all, or even most, Americans
accepted Christian sexual morality, if such offenses against that morality
as prostitution, adultery, homosexuality, or fornication "evoked as wide
and deep an antipathy as infanticide, gladiatorial contests, or suicide,
those offenses would be immoral. Period" (p. 232). Demonstrably they
do not. And since unanimity of feeling on such matters has dissipated,
"their morality is contestable" and the invocation of moral traditions will
prove ineffectual (p. 232). Argument will not suffice to convince some-
one that infanticide is a bad thing. And anyone who seriously demands
that you provide an argument against infanticide "inhabits a different
moral universe" (p. 230).
Posner passes lightly over the ubiquitous conflicts among those who
inhabit different moral universes, leaving the reader to wonder if he
believes that such conflicts will yield to the commanding logic of eco-
nomic rationality. Had he paid more attention to history, he might have
noticed that if history teaches anything, it assuredly teaches that inhabit-
ants of different moral universes frequently have great difficulty in coex-
isting peacefully. He does acknowledge that the United States today
combines an extraordinarily high level of allegiance to Christian beliefs
with an extraordinarily high rate of crime, but does not dwell upon possi-
ble explanations.
More to the point, and independent of specific crimes, the varied moral
universes of different Americans are resulting in ferocious disputes, most
dramatically over abortion, but also over homosexuality, pornography,
and more. In the spirit of economic rationality, Posner valiantly
attempts to maintain neutrality with respect to these struggles, stead-
fastly refusing to credit the validity of moral claims on one side or the
other. From time to time, however, he betrays his impatience with the
sexual radicals, most notably Marcuse, who, he contends, remain pas-
sionately committed to their own version of a moral conception of sex,
notwithstanding its apparent reversal of the traditional religious concep-
tions. As Posner shrewdly remarks, "the idea that polymorphous perver-
sity is the road to Utopia has been shown to be no more convincing than
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of various forms of sexual liberation yield nothing to their adversaries in
the sanctimonious passion with which they defend their views.
The tendency emerges most clearly from the debates over abortion, in
which the practical issue of the availability of abortion must be separated
from the terms in which that availability is defended. Increasingly, pro-
ponents of available abortion have cast their position in the argument of
individual rights.7 Arguments abound that, for women, access to abor-
tion constitutes a fundamental, constitutional right. Underlying these
arguments, and occasionally surfacing within them, lies the moral prem-
ise that pregnancy constrains women's equality in relation to men. Since
men cannot be burdened by pregnancy, respect for equality demands that
women not be burdened either. Proponents of this view believe their
cause to be one of the most rudimentary fairness and morality.
As Posner suggests in his discussion of abortion, the clashes that rend
American culture are not simply over ideology, however much they are
those, but clashes over material interests as well, for example, child sup-
port payments. He rightly argues that many of the women who oppose
abortion are attempting to defend the frayed remnants of a world in
which men were held to protect and support women.' The virtual disap-
pearance of female virginity as a commodity to be traded for male protec-
tion and support has left them vulnerable, especially since it has already
been encoded in no-fault divorce. Many women do understand, how-
ever, that the public acceptance of abortion would indeed release men
from virtually all responsibility for procreation and thus deliver the death
blow to marriage as we have known it.
TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF SEXUALITY
Posner is at his best in such passing observations-and the book
abounds with them-which demonstrate his capacity for empathy and
humane understanding. He displays, throughout, an acute grasp of the
monumental-I am tempted to say revolutionary-significance of the
changes in women's situation in the late twentieth century. Yet he reso-
lutely eschews the least trace of sentimentality. His own primary interest
obviously lies in the possibility of scientific understanding-the ability of
the human mind to grasp the scheme of things entire. Such an enterprise
leaves scant room for sentimentality or parti pris of any kind. It is diffi-
7. For a fuller development of this argument, see Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Feminism and the
Rhetoric of Individual Rights, Parts I & II," Common Knowledge, nos. 1 & 2 (1992). Similar
arguments can also be found in Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); and her Rights Talk- The Impoverishment of Political
Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991).
8. For confirmation of this position, see, for example, Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of
Motherhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and Faye D. Ginsburg, Contested
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cult, if not impossible, fairly to charge Posner with taking sides, although
one can imagine a Christian theologian who charges him with hubris.
For Posner, above all, wants passionately to understand how it works.
This passion for functionalism leads him to speculate whether, in the
end, "a moral conception of sex . . . is vital to civilization" (p. 240).
Obviously, he thinks not. In his view, only by divorcing sex from moral-
ity can we hope to construct a rational system of regulation, although he
falls cautiously and uncharacteristically silent on how the divorce is to be
effected. Yet it defies credulity to suggest that those who will go to the
wall to defend their own moral position will suddenly decide that sexual
issues have no moral consequences at all.
In his third section Posner brings to bear on the specific problems of
regulation his general emphasis "on seeking functional explanations for
rules and practices often thought to be based unreflectively on tradition,
superstition, or misogyny" (p. 243). He displays, throughout, a com-
mendably judicious and thoughtful tone, as well as considerable sensitiv-
ity to the emotionally and ideologically charged positions of others. His
proposals for regulation embody a radical break with the attitudes and
practices of the past, albeit a radicalism expressed in the sober tones of
reason. Here the significance of his "scientific" functionalism finally
becomes clear: rather than arguing that the only response to our current
crisis over the appropriate limits, if any, to sexual self-expression is to
embrace functionalism, he elides the present with the past by asserting
that regulations of sexuality have never been anything but functional.
Thus, however reasonable and possibly constructive his specific sugges-
tions, we would miss the larger significance of his bold project were we to
divorce them from the more comprehensive judicial philosophy from
which they derive and which they articulate.
Consider marriage. Stripped to its functional essentials, marriage has
served as the cornerstone of the regulation of sex and reproduction.
Across history and cultures, "marriage-related laws regulating sex have
been on the whole efficient adaptations to social conditions" (p. 266).
Posner allows that even polygamy and the prohibition of divorce have, in
time and place, served important social purposes, notably forms of pro-
tection for women and children. In a similar spirit he insists that all
societies have manifested an inverse relation between restrictions on mar-
riage, and nonmarital sex. In a regime of noncompanionate marriage,
nonmarital sex of all kinds will abound; in a regime of companionate
marriage, nonmarital sex will diminish. By this logic, if we abolished all
restrictions on marriage, we would, by the same token, abolish all dis-
tinctions between marital and nonmarital sex.
In Posner's judgment, the growing economic power and personal inde-
pendence of women, together with the disappearance of the legal status




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
ern nations have effectively laid the groundwork for "the replacement of
marriage [as] a status relationship--that is a relationship imposing rights
and duties that cannot be altered by contract-by contractual cohabita-
tion, the relationship at issue in 'palimony' cases" (p. 264). As contract
continues to erode the status of marriage, it will become increasingly dif-
ficult for "society to withhold legal recognition of unconventional forms
of voluntary sexual relationships, including polygamous and homosexual
relationships," even if it refuses to call them marriages (p. 266). And if
the law continues to develop in this direction, cohabitation contracts and
marriages are likely to become increasingly indistinguishable, so that,
eventually, all such relations will be marriages or there will be no mar-
riages at all. Why not then conclude that, with marriage reduced to a
voluntary contract between any two individuals who chose to enter into
it for any duration they wish, an hour with a prostitute would be one
among many forms of marriage rather than an instance of nonmarital
sex?
Posner returns to marriage in his discussion of policies toward homo-
sexuality. Could it not, he queries, plausibly be argued that as "hetero-
sexual marriage becomes ever more unstable, temporary, and childless,"
it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish it from homosexual
relations? But might that growing similarity not, he continues, be less a
point in favor of homosexual marriage than one in favor of chucking
marriage as a distinct institution and explicitly recognizing it as a con-
tract? The real problem, Posner allows, lies in the entitlements that
accompany marriage. Should homosexual couples enjoy marital benefits
in inheritance, social security, income tax, welfare payments, adoption,
medical benefits, life insurance, immigration, and the rest? Should they
have the same rights of adoption and custody as heterosexual couples?
Posner believes that we would do best to treat each of the entitlements
separately, rather than as a group; he also believes that none alone and
maybe not all together justify a decisive rejection of homosexual mar-
riage. The salient issue should be whether the costs outweigh the bene-
fits. For the moment, however, he avers, public hostility to
homosexuality forces the conclusion that homosexual marriage is not a
feasible option.
Many readers will doubtless find it significant-and even sinister-that
Posner so easily defers to a presumed public opinion with respect to
homosexual marriage. But in accepting the unlikelihood of public sup-
port for homosexual marriage, he artfully dodges the more serious ques-
tions concerning the allocation of social resources. The entitlements that
accompany marriage as a relation and a status embody some residual
public concern about the conditions under which children live and
mature. The United States, with its customary preference for private
rather than public support of children, has, much more than other indus-
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trialized nations, entrusted almost the entire economic responsibility for
children to their parents. Had we an extensive network of family sup-
port, we probably would not face the issues that Posner raises. We have,
in effect, identified marriage as the core of family life, as the privileged
locus of social transfer payments. No wonder that, under these condi-
tions, we face an escalating battle about who has a right to enjoy those
benefits. But, by the same token, we have tied a cultural-for some, a
moral-preference to have children reared in a heterosexual setting to
economic benefits for individuals. In this sense our delinquency with
respect to public support for reproduction has fueled an acrimonious
debate about the putative morality of limiting marriage (economic
advantages for specific individuals) to those who profess one form of sex-
ual preference rather than another.
Posner brings his special combination of logic and social realism to
bear upon all of the other difficult and contested issues of sexual regula-
tion: homosexuals as teachers, homosexuals in the military, contracep-
tion, abortion, sodomy, pornography, nudity, and coercive sex. The
logic of his position remains fundamentally hostile to any regulation that
curtails the personal autonomy of adults, but time and again he backs off
the extreme position out of respect for what he takes to be strong com-
munity sensibility. Thus he presents us with a paradox: He unilaterally
rejects the alternate theories of sexuality, notably Christian morality, as
adequate justifications for regulation, but frequently accepts other peo-
ple's adherence to them. He shows altogether less patience with the sen-
sibilities of radicals, notably some feminists, who seek new justifications
for regulation. If, he impatiently observes, we cannot distinguish
between a Reubens and a Playboy centerfold because both embody patri-
archy and misogyny, then we cannot regulate the dissemination of either.
As ideologies, both patriarchy and misogyny are protected by the First
Amendment.
Posner reserves his greatest impatience for the liberal Supreme Court
of 1965 to 1977, which, in his judgment, effected its own sexual revolu-
tion. In a succession of decisions, notably in Roe v. Wade, the Court's
"curious appropriation of the word privacy to describe what is not pri-
vacy in the ordinary sense but rather freedom is an attempt by semantic
legerdemain to make sexual liberty appear to occupy a different plane of
social value from economic liberty. It does not" (p. 335). The problem
does not lie in the description of a prohibition against abortion as "a
deprivation of a pregnant woman's liberty"; the problem lies in the
description of it "as a denial of due process of law" (p. 336). By its
reasoning and rhetoric, the Court opened itself to the suspicion that the
justices were following their own values and politics, which seemed, how-
ever oddly, "aligned with those of the student radicals of the 1960s, for
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coin, while economic liberty they considered a mask for exploitation" (p.
338).
Posner reproaches the Court for having combined the deregulation of
sexuality with the regulation of the economy, for having reduced liberty
to sexual liberty while hampering the beneficent effects of economic lib-
erty. He further reproaches it for having taken sides, on the basis of
inadequate and even faulty legal reasoning, in the war between compet-
ing cultural and social values. The principal opposition to abortion, he
reminds us, comes not from macho types and Don Juans, who probably
favor it because it relieves them of responsibility, but from women and
men who genuinely believe in the sanctity of fetal life. For many of those
who support abortion, he continues, abortion constitutes the very symbol
of feminism. "Should the Supreme Court take sides between feminism
and antifeminism" (p. 340)? Should it take sides between the differing
economic interests represented by the different groups of women? Do
not such battles appropriately belong in the legislatures rather than in the
courts? And finally, "Can we rightly call antiabortion laws even prima
facie discriminatory against women if in fact they help some women and
hurt others" (p. 341)?
Make no mistake. Posner does not oppose abortion, at least not dur-
ing the early months of a pregnancy. He bitterly opposes the grounds
upon which Roe v. Wade was decided. Above all he reproaches the
Court for having failed to formulate "a coherent body of constitutional
doctrine to decide issues of sexual autonomy" (p. 350). Firmly con-
vinced that any responsible policy must be resolutely secular and must be
grounded in utilitarian, pragmatic, and scientific arguments, he believes
that the Court of the late 1960s and early 1970s simply substituted one
system of "morality" for another, thus seriously jeopardizing the long-
range prospects for a responsible, rational policy in keeping with the
changing economic conditions of our society.
Unlike many conservatives, Posner does not count himself among
those who revere "original intent" and has no interest in retarding or
distorting the progress of economic development, even if that develop-
ment forces us to rethink or conceivably jettison our most cherished
beliefs. In keeping with a truly secular and pragmatic attitude, justices,
in his view, must be willing to "invalidate state or federal laws on consti-
tutional grounds without insisting that the invalidation be firmly
grounded in the text of the Constitution" (p. 350). For those who are not
prepared to do so will probably end by rejecting "the very idea of a con-
stitutional right of sexual autonomy, or at the very least refuse to extend
it beyond the existing precedents, narrowly interpreted" (p. 350).
THE AGE OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
Posner clearly believes that the age of sexual autonomy has arrived,
258 [Vol. 5: 243
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/16
Fox-Genovese
although we have not yet figured out how to deal with it. He drives the
point home in a discussion of reproduction, from adoption to surrogate
motherhood, arguing that modem technology has opened the prospect of
the separation of reproduction from sex. Modem reproductive technolo-
gies have provoked mixed reactions from feminists, although Posner
expresses bemusement that feminists should worry about the decline in
mothering since feminism has so aggressively sought to liberate women
from traditional roles. But then, he notes, with a deadpan twist of the
knife, "Fertility is just another asset, like a professional degree or other
job-market human capital" (p. 425). Should men ever succeed, through
cloning or artificial wombs, in completely freeing reproduction from
women, women who are no longer needed as mothers probably would
experience a reduction in their income. For the foreseeable future, how-
ever, artificial reproduction strengthens the bargaining position of
women in relation to men, increases women's full income relative to that
of men, and, accordingly, "presages a further shift in sexual attitudes and
behavior toward the Swedish model" (p. 432).
The Swedish model fascinates Posner, although he does not entirely
approve of it. Sweden, he believes, has largely succeeded in freeing sexu-
ality from the manacles of morality and reproduction from the control of
men. Sweden has also gone a long way toward the assimilation of mar-
riage as status to marriage as contract, offering couples who wish to
cohabit but not to undertake the commitment of marriage a cohabitation
contract, which also provides homosexuals with a facsimile of marriage.
Posner especially approves Sweden's extensive program in sex education
and easy access to contraception, which, in his judgment, help to account
for the comparatively low level of unplanned teenage pregnancies and
abortions. The Swedish nonmarital birth rate nonetheless remains very
high "because marriage confers relatively few benefits on Swedish
women" (p. 166). Hence the paradox that although Sweden is, in most
respects, "a more socialistic society than the United States," as evident in
its extensive system of child welfare, "it may in matters related to sex
more nearly approximate a free-market society than the United States
does" (p. 167).
Notwithstanding Posner's deep reservations about Sweden's regulated
economic system, he clearly believes that other Western societies are liv-
ing through changes that should bring them closer to the Swedish free
market in sex. He believes, in other words, that we will not respond
adequately to the changes of our times unless we succeed in separating
sex, morality, and reproduction from one another and in thinking dispas-
sionately-scientifically-about each on its intrinsic merits. However
contradictory it may seem, the various forms of artificial reproduction
do simultaneously emancipate women from dependence upon men and
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tion from sexual intercourse reduces the dependence of each sex on the
other" (p. 425).
Posner is too cautious, or perhaps too much of a gentleman, openly to
celebrate the changes that are engulfing us. He even demonstrates
guarded respect and sympathy for the proponents of traditional morality,
who are losing the cultural war. He is much harder on liberal justices,
radical feminists, and assorted other radicals, possibly because he recog-
nizes them as dangerous opponents in the battle to shape the future. But
it is hard not to believe that, at least on some level, Posner does welcome
their projected brave new world of sexual autonomy. After all, as he
assuredly understands, the mutual dependence of women and men upon
each other, and of children upon both, anchored the dense fabric of
beliefs and practices that have made up civilization and that, not inciden-
tally, offered the most durable barrier to the unfettered progress of the
market.
RATIONAL CHOICE JURISPRUDENCE
The rise and triumph of sexual autonomy bring personal life com-
pletely in line with the workings of the market, which Posner regards as
the most reliable standard for human relations and social policies. The
rapidity and novelty of the changes through which we are living seem to
sever us from traditional moorings. Sex offers Posner an unparalleled
opportunity to press the merits of his preferred vision of jurisprudence.
In this respect Sex and Reason can profitably be read as a gloss on and
case study for his theoretical treatise, The Problems of Jurisprudence, in
which he elaborates his judicial philosophy-although, hostile to meta-
physics, he would probably prefer a word like attitudes-and identifies
himself as, above all, a libertarian and a pragmatist.
The brand of pragmatism that I like emphasizes the scientific virtues
(open-minded, no-nonsense inquiry), elevates the process of inquiry
over the results of inquiry, prefers ferment to stasis, dislikes distinc-
tions that make no practical difference-in other words, dislikes
"metaphysics"-is doubtful of finding "objective truth" in any area
of inquiry, is uninterested in creating an adequate philosophical
foundation for its thought and action, likes experimentation, likes to
kick sacred cows, and-within the bounds of prudence-prefers
shaping the future to maintaining continuity with the past.9
Posner elaborates his distaste for blind devotion to continuity with the
past in his rejection of the claims of natural law. Attacking Ronald
Dworkin, he dismisses the concept, arguing that to confuse law with
morality is first to strip it of its distinctiveness and subsequently to con-
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fuse it with politics, a confusion which ultimately leads to its own nega-
tion-no law.
Without social, cultural, and political homogeneity, a legal system is
not able to generate demonstrably right, or even professionally com-
pelling, answers to difficult legal questions, whether from within the
legal culture or by reference to moral or other extralegal norms-
the traditional province of natural law. For without either nature,
or a political, social, and moral community so monolithic that the
prevailing legal norms are "natural" in the sense of taken for
granted, natural law can be but a shadow of its former self--can be
but a name for the considerations that influence law even though not
prescribed by a legislature or other official body.' 0
In Sex and Reason Posner relies upon the collapse of moral consensus in
the United States to justify his "pragmatic" and skeptical investigation of
sexual practices and norms. His investigation of sexuality thus manifests
his conviction that the responsibility of a judge must always be to substi-
tute "the humble, fact-bound, policy-soaked, instrumental concept of
'reasonableness' for both legal and moral rightness."'"
Posner apparently equates his attack on natural law and other illusions
of moral rectitude with an attack on bigotry, superstition, and irrational-
ity. In directing his attack on natural law against Dworkin, he cleverly,
if perversely, associates the defense of moral certainty and natural law
with liberals and radicals. In this spirit he contemptuously associates
Marcuse's permissive notion that polymorphous perversity paves the
road to Utopia with the repressive ideas of Catholic and Victorian sexual
theorists, arguing that there is nothing to choose between them. All of
those who support one or another moral theory of sexuality fall into the
same trap, namely, the assumption that a moral conception of sex "is
vital to civilization" (p. 240). For Posner, it is not.
The breathtaking assertion that civilization does not require a moral
conception of sex exposes the full measure of Posner's own kind of radi-
calism, which is grounded in his repudiation of the claims of history. By
associating the moral theory of sex with permissive radicals on the one
hand and repressive reactionaries on the other, Posner engages in a skill-
ful sleight of hand that, whatever his intentions, leans toward nihilism.
By categorically defining his opponents, he is attempting to structure the
entire debate, excluding a broad group from traditional conservatives to
moderate leftists who, differences among them notwithstanding, might
not oppose all of his specific policy recommendations but would seriously
question his libertarian premises.
10. Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence, 23.
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MORALITY OF SEX OR MORALITY OF REPRODUCTION?
Throughout Sex and Reason Posner plausibly argues that the most
momentous change of modern times lies in the changing situation of
women, who increasingly enjoy the prospect of economic independence
and who have effectively lost the protections and the constraints of mar-
riage. Posner argues that as women have gained access to the status of
autonomous economic agents they have, by the same token, claimed con-
trol of their own sexuality and with it of reproduction. In his judgment
these developments have virtually exploded previous sexual norms,
moral as well as institutional. They thus invite--or dictate-the accept-
ance of "morally indifferent sex" (p. 85).
Posner appears to be advocating a world in which the only bonds
among individuals result from their market relations. Many feminists,
with some reason, would counter that women do not yet enjoy equality
in the market with men and cannot expect to in the near future. They
would further argue that the only way to protect women against male
brutality and competition is to enlist a strong state in their cause. Pos-
ner, of course, has no use for the welfare state, much less for socialism.
Yet it is far from clear that, left to its own devices, the market will pro-
vide adequately for women, much less for children. In this respect the
world of poor, single teenage mothers in the United States probably
offers a more faithful picture of the market at work than the comfortably
situated single mothers of Sweden.
This contrast suggests that Sweden's sexual freedom may not be as
morally indifferent as Posner would have us believe. Sweden does pro-
vide for women and children, and not merely by disseminating sex edu-
cation in the schools. Indeed, in an extraordinary concession, Posner
admits that Swedish sex education seems to prove most effective when it
is grounded in instruction by parents (note the plural) in the home. Pos-
ner also recognizes that Swedish-and even the more permissive Dan-
ish-cohabitation contracts for homosexuals do not include children.
Thus Posner's emphasis on the freedom of adults to engage in various
sexual relations in various situations obscures the extent to which provi-
sion for children remains inescapably tied to a conception of sexual
morality in the full sense.
Posner notes, without comment, that in Sweden the taxpayer has
assumed the role of the husband in providing for women and children.
In the United States, where the free market enjoys much greater latitude
than in Sweden, the taxpayer assuredly has not. Indeed, it is permissible
to speculate that male taxpayers, who frequently cannot be induced to
pay private child support, may long resist assuming those responsibilities.
Doubtless Posner is correct that our particular situation, with its appal-
ling rates of teen pregnancy, unwanted pregnancy, violence, and all the
rest, owes much to our moral and ideological diversity. Doubtless he is
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also correct that the prospects for a complete victory by one or another
morality are slight. But it does not follow from those premises that we
should expect to sustain some facsimile of civilization with no moral con-
cept of sex, nor does it follow that our accelerating collapse into an
aggregation of autonomous (and, as Hobbes said, warring) individuals
will produce any kind of civilization.
As it happens, I have no special difficulty with any of Posner's specific
proposals for sexual policy, not because I agree with all of them, but
because they are, on the whole, admirably thoughtful and respectful of
what community sentiment is likely to tolerate. My difficulties concern
Posner's premises about the divorce of sex from morality and reproduc-
tion, with their embedded disdain for the abiding consequences of his-
tory. The indisputable advantage of Posner's economic and
sociobiological method lies in putting our personal parochialisms in a
healthy, skeptical perspective. Sexual customs and moralities have
varied tremendously across time and space. There is a dangerous arro-
gance in assuming that the assumptions of one society or time period
necessarily hold for another.
Posner argues that the primary variations in sexuality cluster around
two main types of marriage (companionate and noncompanionate), but
in abstracting marriage from political systems, religions, and the rearing
of children, he abstracts from the social fabric in which sexual moralities
are elaborated, experienced, and transgressed. In the United States
today, the level of transgression seems extraordinarily high relative to the
Judeo-Christian norms in which so many Americans of different ethnici-
ties were reared. And it is clear that prolonged public tolerance of trans-
gression seriously erodes inherited beliefs, which are increasingly seen
not to be about people's lives.
Sex and sexuality, however paradoxically, afford Posner an invaluable
weapon in the justification of his libertarian commitment to the market
as the ultimate arbiter of social differences. He seems to be arguing that
since we have no hope of resolving our moral differences about sexuality,
we might just as well leave them to the workings of the market. But his
apparently forthright realism in this regard merely serves to repress
another, and for him altogether more serious, topic--economics itself.
For in Posner's mental universe, the sanctity of economics-understood
as the minimally restricted capitalist free market-must be accepted as
given. But since reproduction is as much a matter of economics as of
sexuality, we are left with an uncomfortable message. For if we agree to
divorce sex from morality and to divorce sex from reproduction, are we
not thereby ominously agreeing to divorce reproduction from morality?
Sexual moralities have always coexisted with economic systems, which
they variously shape and are shaped by. In that delicate balance, most
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human greed and jockeying for advantage. Sexual moralities, in con-
trast, even when they are not scrupulously observed, tend to be viewed as
normative stories about what it means to be civilized. Above all they
embody the taboos that define the essence of human communities-the
conditions of their reproduction. In the end, the sanctity and sense of
responsibility with which we regard reproduction may be more impor-
tant to a people's moral theory of sexuality than the specific acts in which
consenting adults engage. And history suggests that markets alone can-
not be trusted to fulfill that function.
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